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Detrimental Land Grabbing or 
Growth Poles?
Determinants and Potential Develop-
ment Effects of Foreign Direct Land 
Investments
by Michael Brüntrup, German Development 
Institute, Bonn
Large-scale Land Acquisition has become a 
source of concern in the last few years. The 
article argues that they will also remain an 
important issue for food security in the future 
since there are several forces driving up the 
interests for these kinds of investments. The 
stakes for poor countries are high: many ad-
vantages such as access to specific markets, 
technology, management, capital, and fi-
nance which can create a considerable num-
ber of jobs and a push for local development 
are opposed by important threats for local po-
pulations but also for the environment. Early 
assessments point to predominantly critical 
situations. Given these trends, Large-scale 
Land Acquisition should not be left to market 
forces alone. National governments, regio-
nal bodies, and the international community 
have a responsibility to protect the interests 
of the poor and shape large-scale land acqui-
sitions in a development-friendly way.
1 Relevance, Location, and Shape of 
Foreign Land Acquisitions
Large-scale Land Acquisition (LSLA), i.e., land 
acquisition or long term lease of, say, more than 
100 up to several million ha – or “land grabbing” 
for those who pronounce the negative aspect of 
these investments – have become a source of con-
cern and international discussion in the last few 
years. Some observers, including the head of the 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), talk 
of “neo-colonialism” (Borger 2008; Robertson, 
Pinstrup-Anderson 2010). This, however, only 
touches the foreign investors (mainly from Chi-
na, states of the Middle East and North Africa, 
Russia, the UK, and the US), while in reality most 
of the land acquisitions are carried out by national 
investors even in countries where one would not 
expect much local capital, and thus remain below 
the radar screen of international attention. For in-
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stance, out of six low-income countries with more 
detailed information on LSLA (for problems of 
data see footnote 2), only Liberia had a domi-
nant share of foreign investors, while in Ethio-
pia and Mozambique they were about 50 % and 
in Cambodia, Sudan, and Nigeria only 3–30 % 
(Deininger, Byerlee 2011, p. xiv). Also detailed 
work from West Africa supports the finding that 
national investors are dominating LSLA (Hilhorst 
et al. 2011). This article does not make an explicit 
distinction between foreign and national LSLA 
except for instances where this is deemed neces-
sary (foreign relations, trade). It is very possible 
that both are stronger interlinked than is visible, if 
national investors act as straw men, particularly if 
laws restrict the purchase of land by foreigners, or 
if they speculate on selling the land later.
After many years in which agriculture was 
mainly seen as a sector with falling prices, se-
veral factors contributed to the current return of 
interest in agriculture in general and LSLA in 
particular. It is important to understand the moti-
vations for LSLA and put them in the wider con-
text of the rekindling of interest in agriculture 
(or even wider, the biomass sector) in order to 
understand the opportunities, threats, and regula-
tory options of this phenomenon.
1. The boom of mainly government-induced bio-
fuel policies in several countries, in particular 
in the EU, the US and Brazil, created a first 
push for LSLA. Since the early 2000s, biofu-
els were seriously promoted for substituting 
fossil fuels and thereby reducing green house 
gas emissions. Blending mandates, flex-fuel 
cars, improved technologies, and guaranteed 
markets created substantial demand for bio-
fuels, particularly since 2005 (GBEP 2008; 
IEA 2010). Several developing countries such 
as Thailand, South Africa, Mexico, and India 
followed the richer countries in implementing 
biofuel policies (ibid). Though these policies 
were mostly “co-aiming” at supporting local 
producers and were therefore often coupled 
with protectionist measures, some investors 
saw the chance in certain countries to produ-
ce for export and started LSLA, often in Least 
Developed Countries (Mitchell 2011).
2. Rising world food market prices since about 
20051, culminating in the food price crises of 
2007/2008 and 2010/2011, gave a substantial 
push to the LSLA for several reasons. While 
until about 2007 the positive price trend was 
only seen as temporary (OECD, FAO 2006), 
it is nowadays widely expected that prices will 
rise substantially at least in the medium future 
(OECD, FAO 2011). This acknowledges that 
food and biomass demand, driven by increa-
sing population and incomes, changing food 
habits and locally shrinking land availability, 
will outpace productivity increases and culti-
vation of existing land reserves. Most obvious-
ly, higher agricultural prices increase returns 
on investment in land acquisition and food pro-
duction. In addition, many importing countries 
fear that availability of food on world markets 
could become a problem, propelled by expe-
riences during the food price crises when ma-
jor exporters closed down or hindered exports. 
Investors from these countries, either national 
organisations such as wealth funds, and – more 
importantly – private investors, are amongst 
the most active in LSLA (Cotula et al. 2009; 
Deininger, Byerlee 2011).
3. Already before the financial and economic crisis 
of 2008/2009, and ever since, financial markets 
have become more volatile and risky, leading in-
vestors to seek for alternative investments, pos-
sibly long-term, stable, and countercyclical. Ag-
riculture and land seem to offer such investment 
opportunities under the described forecasts.
4. With rising oil price, biomass increasingly beco-
mes an interesting feedstock for the petrochemi-
cal industry. Technological progress in biotech-
nology will allow improvements in production, 
processing, design, and cascading use of bio-
based materials. Investors interested in LSLA 
may also speculate on this emerging trend.
5. The sale of certificates for reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation by 
planting and protecting forest also started to at-
tract investors and was labelled as potentially 
“the biggest land grab of all time” (Mukerjee 
2009; compare Deininger, Byerlee 2011).
6. Speculation, given the grounded expectation 
of rising value of land in the future due to the 
above mentioned trends, is certainly also a 
strong driver for LSLA.
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Thus, LSLA is only one part of an increasing 
engagement in the entire biomass sector which 
is expected to boom. This expectation is shared 
by researchers of different professions, govern-
ments, investors, and analysts. However, while 
large-scale investments in backward and forward 
segments of agricultural supply chains are well 
known for providing economies of scale in mar-
ket access and cost advantages, agricultural pro-
duction at a large scale is not straightforward the 
best way to invest: economies of scale and better 
management compete with transaction and su-
pervision costs and higher flexibility of smaller, 
typically family farms (Berry, Cline 1979). Thus, 
historically LSLA was confined to areas where, 
by nature or by force, large tracts of land were 
free or with low cost to obtain, and where low la-
bour needs (e.g. extensive livestock), very cheap 
labour (e.g. slaves or forced labour, isolated are-
as) or decisive progresses in mechanisation (e.g. 
grains and oilseeds) were favouring large-scale 
agriculture (Binswanger et al. 1995).
Apart from the mentioned new economic 
incentives for LSLA for specific outputs, some 
other factors contribute to their growing attrac-
tiveness. New technologies reduce some of the 
traditional disadvantages of large production 
units. Higher standards and documentation re-
quirements promote vertical integration and gro-
wing concentration of agricultural supply chains 
(Stephenson 1997), making the integration of 
production into larger units more attractive vis-à-
vis a cumbersome, unreliable, and risky organi-
sation of procurement from smallholders. Finally 
neglect of smallholders and their organisations as 
well as of support systems for agriculture in the 
last decades have also contributed to lowering 
their performance to organise the products that 
are in demand (Robertson, Pinstrup-Anderson 
2010; FAO 2009a; FAO 2009b).
Of all LSLA between 2001 and 2011, which 
are estimated to be around 80 million hectares, 
up to 60 % are to be found in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) (The International Land Coalition 2011, 
cited in The Economist 2011). Other sources re-
port a slightly less, but still dominant concentrati-
on in SSA (see Figure 1).2 This is somewhat high-
er than the overall estimation of the share of SSA 
Figure 1:  Frequency distribution of projects and total land area by destination region and 
commodity group
Source: Fischer, Shah 2010, cited in Deininger, Byerlee 2011, p. 52
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in potentially available land for agriculture (45 % 
of 446 million ha, Fisher and Shah 2010 cited in 
Deininger, Byerlee 2011, p. 34).3 The countries 
that attract most investors are Sudan, Ethiopia, 
Nigeria, Ghana, and Mozambique, but also a 
wide range of other countries are concerned. In 
a formal analysis of factors affecting the proba-
bility that a country is targeted by foreign LSLA, 
Deininger, Byerlee (2011) found that the most 
significant variable was rural land rights recog-
nition, which was negatively correlated to invest-
ment announcements and implementation, while 
the investment protection rank was less or not 
significant. This is particularly worrisome since 
it makes it more likely that the rural population 
with its various existing rights may be negatively 
affected by these investments (see next chapter).
2 Opportunities and Threats of LSLA for 
Rural Development
While the previous section asked what motivates 
investors to invest in LSLA, this section reviews 
the consequences for the receiving countries and 
particularly for the affected rural areas. It starts 
with the opportunities, reminding that investors 
usually do not act against the will of the host 
country, but by – often outspoken – invitation. 
Many countries have tried for decades, and are 
still trying, to attract foreign investors into ru-
ral regions, and offer special incentives such as 
preferential tax, import and export and financial 
transfer regimes for reasons listed below (Cotula 
et al. 2009; Deininger, Byerlee 2011).
Of course, not all opportunities are equally 
important for all actors, and often it is only a frac-
tion of the stakeholders – typically national and/
or local elites and some government agencies – 
which really interact with investors. One of the 
most intriguing observations on the new wave of 
LSAL is the fact that hardly any details of con-
tracts are publicly known, and in known contracts 
promised effects, rights, and obligations are only 
vaguely spelled out (Cotula 2010). Older LSLA, 
though created in very different contexts, that have 
survived the stormy economic and political times 
which prevailed in many of the concerned coun-
tries, often exhibit at least some of the mentioned 
positive effects (but of course also the problems).4
• Access to and favourable conditions for capi-
tal/credit: Capital and credit are notoriously 
lacking in rural areas of developing countries 
but are necessary in many forms in agricul-
tural production, from seasonal to long-term. 
FAO (2009b) has estimated the requirements 
in annual agricultural investment at 89–209 
billion US$. Agricultural credit in particular is 
difficult to organise in comparison to other sec-
tors, due to high production and market risks 
and long periods to recover the capital. Large 
investors have access to national and internati-
onal capital markets. Particularly international 
capital markets have the appropriate long-term 
loans that are necessary to establish agricultu-
ral production capacities. In investments invol-
ving contract farming, many investors channel 
part of this capital to small and medium far-
mers in return for a right on the produce. These 
contract schemes are eased if the investor has 
a local monopsony or offers higher prices be-
cause of better marketing options (Eaton, She-
pherd 2001; Brüntrup, Peltzer 2007).
• Access to markets. As explained above from 
the point of view of the investors, some mar-
kets tend to be better adapted to larger and in-
tegrated value chains. These include products 
which are easily degradable and where logis-
tics must be very tight to reduce losses and keep 
quality (e.g. sugarcane, flowers, fruits, and ve-
getables). These logistics are typically rare in 
poor countries, and without a large integrated 
investor such markets are lost for smallholders 
in the worldwide competition for production 
sites. Most public and private standards re-
quire additional, often fixed costs which stress 
smallholders’ notoriously scarce resources and 
increase unit costs in small-scale more than in 
large-scale production. Also products for niche 
markets which are difficult to organise on an 
anonymous market do not favour smallhol-
ders. Even in industrialised countries market 
access is an important argument for vertical 
integration (Eaton, Shepherd 2001), though in 
these countries integration typically stops at 
long-term contract farming. In poor countries, 
however, complete vertical integration inclu-
ding production is favoured by the perception 
(and often experience) that smallholders are 
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unable or unreliable to stick to contracts and 
to produce the right quantities at the right time. 
Thus, these sub-sectors tend to be feasible in 
poor countries mainly under large-scale pro-
duction, and thus draw in LSLA.
• Investments in local infrastructure: Generally, 
poor countries possess less infrastructure im-
portant for agricultural production such as 
dams and irrigation canals, roads, cooling 
chains, electricity, and port facilities, while in 
richer countries these facilities are taken for 
granted and are provided by the public (FAO 
2009b). Particularly for linking remote areas 
to markets, such investments are necessary to 
boost agriculture but difficult to finance and 
maintain by governments of poor countries 
and impossible to finance by smallholders. 
Large-scale agricultural investors often can 
and must build (part of) such infrastructure, 
up to entire port terminals. Some of the in-
vestments are public or club goods, providing 
additional advantages for an entire area or for 
a group of actors outside the investment, for 
instance contract farmers.
• Access to and development of knowledge, 
technologies, and management: In contrast to 
perception, agriculture – both traditional and 
modern – is intensive in knowledge, techno-
logies, and management. While in advanced 
countries agricultural technology such as im-
proved varieties, adapted machinery or inputs 
is readily available on the market, this is often 
not the case in poor countries. Large investors 
are able to access international standard tech-
nologies and adapt them to their own needs, 
even develop their own technologies at least 
to a certain degree. Particularly international 
investors are able to transfer knowledge from 
one country to another.
• Better soil fertility management: Although 
there are important environmental concerns 
about large-scale agriculture (see below), one 
positive aspect is that they are able to provide 
crops and soils with sufficient plant nutrients, 
particularly phosphorus and potassium which 
are often scarce in many tropical soils and dif-
ficult to restitute fully by organic means only.
• Formal, often relatively well-paid and secured 
jobs: Large-scale agriculture can pay higher 
and more secure salaries than the informal sec-
tor in rural areas. These salaries may, however, 
not be competitive with an entire farm income 
(an argument found e.g. in Deiniger, Byerlee 
2011) which is subject to strong variations and 
usually the result of an entire farm household, 
not an individual person. In many cases, farm 
households do (no longer) rely on farm income 
alone (Ellis 2000). Thus formal jobs are highly 
appreciated in the rural areas. Therefore jobs 
are often the single most important reason 
for (development-oriented) elites to support 
LSLA. The number of jobs created depends 
very much on the crop and the technology cho-
sen: Deininger, Byerlee (2011) indicate num-
bers from 10 jobs per 1000 ha (grains) to 700 
(sugarcane-ethanol with manual harvest).
• Indirect effects on rural and national econo-
my: Indirect effects of LSLA are difficult to 
capture, they occur in the medium to long run 
due to structural changes in the (rural) econo-
my. Positive effects must be expected to derive 
from increased spending capacities of workers 
for local goods and services and local supply 
response as well as strong backward and for-
ward linkages in up- and downstream or sup-
port sectors during operation (transport, se-
curity, processing for local/regional markets, 
etc.). According to research on agricultural 
growth linkages, in poorer countries demand 
linkages will prevail, in more advanced coun-
tries back- and forward linkages (Bresciani, 
Valdés 2007). Often, rural hubs are emerging 
in the vicinity of large estates, especially if 
they are employment-intensive, which satisfy 
further needs of the rural population.
• Taxes and levies: Though investors are exem-
pted from taxes and levies for a certain period 
in many countries if they invest in rural are-
as, they are finally expected to contribute to 
national and/or local government revenues. 
In the initial phases of investments this may 
not be visible, but for instance in Malawi the 
long established monopolist sugar company 
is one of the major tax payers in the count-
ry (GOM 2006). Whether local communities 
benefit from LSLA depends on the fiscal set-
ting – many communities do not have the right 
to charge local taxes. However, without such 
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increased incomes, local communities may 
be financially squeezed because often LSLA 
means population influx and higher financial 
needs in the medium to long term for social 
infrastructure and services, while returns from 
central to local government may not honour 
these higher needs. In these cases in particu-
lar, voluntary contributions from the investors 
(see next point) are extremely important.
• Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) pro-
jects: CSR activities such as public infrastruc-
ture (schools, wells, clinics, feeder roads) are 
part of many LSLA deals. They can be directed 
to own employees or to the wider communities. 
In the latter case, they can create substantial be-
nefits also to those people who do not directly 
benefit from labour contracts or products and 
create a positive political backing in the region.
• Agricultural production for internal markets: 
Although foreign investors usually envisage 
external markets, in many deals it is known 
that provisions are made to supply national 
markets, too. Often governments urge to con-
sider national food security issues, in parti-
cular for times of scarcity (Cotula 2010). Po-
tentially, large producers could easily satisfy 
the usually relatively small formal markets, 
particularly if they substitute imports which 
– due to tariffs and transaction costs – have 
higher import parity prices. Although many 
poor countries have become net food impor-
ters, these arrangements must be carefully ba-
lanced in order to not push smallholders out 
of national markets to which they have better 
access than to international markets.
• Exports and balance of payments: Many poor, 
agriculture-based countries rely on agricul-
ture for export earnings to import the many 
goods and services which are not produced in 
these small economies. Large investors, for 
reasons discussed above (standards, finance, 
volume, integration), are better positioned to 
access markets abroad, and to serve this ne-
cessity. In contrast to investments in other 
sectors where imports can bear a substantial 
share of value addition, agriculture creates by 
nature a relatively large local value addition.
These potential opportunities are confronted with 
substantial risks of LSLA. Some of them have 
already been introduced or are simply the inver-
sion of the opportunities, but some are genuine:
• Base of existence of smallholder and rural 
livelihoods: The loss of land touches the very 
core of the existence of rural livelihoods in 
poor countries. Though it has been argued that 
many do not live on agriculture alone and are 
bound to leave the agricultural sector in the 
long-term, in the short- to medium-term most 
need or would strongly prefer to own land for 
subsistence and also market agriculture in or-
der to attenuate risks from other incomes, in-
cluding from salaries on large farms. The right 
to food in rural areas often still translates into 
having access to productive resources for ag-
riculture.5 For many other households not di-
rectly losing land, grazing or gathering rights 
as well as access to water may be at stake.
• Local food markets: With the diversion of 
large tracks of land to crops for export pro-
duction (which many LSLAs aim at), the 
production for local food markets may suffer. 
Particularly in time of scarcity on national 
food markets, the export of food is morally 
inacceptable and politically suicidal.
• Cultural and religious values: Land in many 
traditional societies has an important non-
economic value, particularly special sites 
such as graveyards, ceremonial forests, or 
landscapes (Chiesura, de Groot 2003).
• Unequal power and knowledge of negotiation 
partners: Farmers, rural inhabitants, traditio-
nal authorities, local communities, and even 
national governments are badly prepared for 
negotiations with large-scale investors. These 
lands were never before or at least for deca-
des not in high demand, which is one of the 
major reasons why in many areas there are 
no formalised land rights. Not only are local 
actors not able to assess the true value of the 
land, they also lack formal negotiation skills, 
procedures, and knowledge how to get a fair 
deal. Of course, this can also lead to exagge-
rated expectations, but the very low prices re-
ported for land sales and leases for very long 
periods insinuate that they lack awareness.
• Underrepresented groups: Particularly vulne-
rable to be overlooked in land deals are users 
of natural resources attached to land such as 
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women, livestock herders, or ethnic minori-
ties (Rossi, Lambrou 2008; Cotula et al. 2009; 
Behrman et al. 2011). They are often discri-
minated by traditional land regimes as well as 
modern land rights and registration processes.
• Lack of formal land rights, overlapping 
(land) property regimes: In many develo-
ping countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, several types of formal and informal 
land rights coexist, with the latter neither 
officially recognised nor registered. Often 
national governments formally own all land 
which is not explicitly under formal private 
property. This claim may coincide with dele-
gated ownership and decision rights to local 
governments or traditional bodies. In additi-
on, traditional leaders and communities have 
their own traditions; sometimes several ethnic 
groups may have differing, even conflicting 
regimes when a region has been settled by 
various groups. Finally, religious rules may 
influence ownership, particularly with respect 
to inheritance of land and attached rights.
• Interference of governments and elites: If LSLA 
takes place in countries with low standards of 
respect to existing (often informal) land rights 
or in remote areas of countries with higher 
standards, corruption, neo-patrimonialistic atti-
tudes, and politics can grossly affect land deals, 
often to the detriment of poorer and underrepre-
sented parts of the population. In fact, elites are 
often actors in LSLA, as brokers or investors 
themselves. The news and case study reports 
are full of deals where elites – often violently 
– let clear land of their inhabitants for investors 
who may or may not be aware of this.6
• Proper compensation: Acknowledgement of 
land and user rights and their compensation in 
open negotiations is usually mentioned as an 
important condition for fair LSLA deals (FAO 
et al. 2010). However, this may not be enough if 
compensations do not create alternative, robust 
livelihoods. For instance, jobs and payments 
may not be stable enough to assure survival 
under adverse conditions, i.e. if the employ-
er, if a business sector, or if food markets fail. 
These collapses are quite likely in poor coun-
tries. In absence of social safety nets, in many 
cases only a compensation which includes a 
minimum of land will provide enough security 
needed for assuring survival in times of crises.
• Environmental degradation: The environment 
is threatened by LSLA in several ways. Ex-
cessive and unprofessional use of fertilisers 
and pesticides can pollute water bodies and 
deteriorate natural habitats. Clearing of large 
tracts of land and intensive tillage reduces na-
tural biodiversity and opens up land to erosi-
on. Investors have more radical means to clear 
the landscape than smallholders. In addition, 
the cultivation of one or a few crops on large 
tracks reduces agro-biodiversity and increase 
pest infestation, requiring higher pesticide use.
• Structural dependency: A serious economic 
threat of LSLA is the fact that entire regions 
can become dependent on one or a few inves-
tors and, according to their investment decis-
ions, on one or a few products. This is parti-
cularly striking in case of bankruptcy which 
can leave degraded and destroyed ecological, 
economic, and/or social environments.
• Lack of spillovers: The absence of the above-
mentioned technological and economic spill-
overs and social investments might leave the 
wider communities around LSLA without real 
development and the large estates as enclaves.
• Local conflicts: Due to the important issues at 
stake described in the last paragraphs, local 
conflicts can easily break out around LSLA. 
In some cases and large projects, even natio-
nal instability can result.7
Whether opportunities or threats prevail in any 
given case of LSLA and for the phenomenon as 
a whole depends on many factors. In fact, most 
present assessments of LSLAs are negative.8 The 
seriousness of the threats entails that LSLAs have 
the duty to inform about and prove their positi-
ve effects and assure against failures. This task 
cannot be left to investors alone. Governments 
have a duty to support and protect the weaker 
and more vulnerable partners, the rural popula-
tion and particularly the weaker parts of it. This 
does not mean that they should inhibit LSLAs, 
given their opportunities, but they have to care-
fully assess them, establish rules for procedures 
and deals, and monitor and evaluate their results. 
The last section will discuss some means to do so.
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Unfortunately, governing elites are often not 
neutral to LSLA, they are profiting or even in-
vestors themselves, which makes it much more 
difficult to design pro-poor LSLA policies. In-
vestors and their banks must have an interest to 
assure fair LSLA deals and results since otherwi-
se their LSLA will be at risk, and the entire ap-
proach will be discredited, including the “good” 
investors. Likewise, the international communi-
ty must be alerted since LSLAs have potentially 
far ranging consequences, in particular for so-
cial peace. Entirely banning LSLA through in-
ternational agreements (e.g. LVC, FIAN 2010), 
however, is not a good option. It would certainly 
(and does already) expel investors from industri-
alised countries which are more or less responsi-
ve to social and economic pressure in their home 
markets. In contrast, investors from developing 
countries are less responsive, more so if from 
undemocratic countries. More generally, the po-
wer of sanctions of industrialised countries is va-
nishing since South-South trade is increasingly 
dominating world agricultural markets.
3 Regulating and Guiding Large-scale Land 
Investments and their Impacts
Starting from the discussed opportunities and 
threats, it is relatively straightforward in many 
instances what has to be given and done to make 
LSLA development-friendly and pro-poor. In ge-
neral, only such large-scale land uses will be eco-
nomically feasible and potentially socially ac-
ceptable which create substantially more profits 
than the sum of the profits of the existing small-
holders and other users of the natural resources 
in question. Only in this case the necessary com-
pensations can be borne.
To actually reach a fair benefit sharing, the 
principles on responsible agricultural invest-
ments currently being developed by a coalition 
of international organisations is certainly a good 
starting point (FAO et al. 2010). They comprise 
seven areas:
1. Land and resource rights: Existing rights to 
land and natural resources are recognised and 
respected;
2. Food security: Investments do not jeopardise 
food security, but rather strengthen it;
3. Transparency, good governance, and the enab-
ling environment: Processes for accessing land 
and making associated investments are trans-
parent, monitored, and ensure accountability;
4. Consultation and participation: Those mate-
rially affected are consulted and agreements 
from consultations are recorded and enforced;
5. Economic viability and responsible agro-enter-
prise investing: Projects are economically viab-
le , respect the rule of law, reflect industry best 
practice, and result in durable shared value;
6. Social sustainability: Investments generate 
desirable social and distributional impacts 
and do not increase vulnerability;
7. Environmental sustainability: Environmental 
impacts are quantified and measures taken to 
encourage sustainable resource use, while mi-
nimising and mitigating their negative impacts.
A real challenge is that these areas need to be filled 
out in practise in the context of an often badly 
governed, non-transparent, interest-loaded, ris-
ky, and uncertain environment, where local and 
national elites are often part of the problem rather 
than the solution. For that, measures in many po-
licy areas have to interplay, such as agriculture, 
natural resources, land use and taxation, labour 
regulation, decentralisation, infrastructure, inter-
national trade and investment agreements as well 
as individual investor contracts, food security, 
and rural development. Some of these measures 
can only be dealt with at the national level, others 
are local, many are of multi-level nature. Citi-
zens, rural and national organisations, and pub-
lic entities have to be well-informed. Optimally, 
regional economic communities would develop 
joint guidelines and set similar investment con-
ditions in order to avoid a race to the bottom by 
competing for investors, but rather create better 
outcomes for receiving countries.
The principles do hardly touch on issues of 
fostering integration of LSLA into broader rural 
development strategies. As argued, additional ef-
forts are needed to avoid negative impacts and 
create positive spillovers that not only create ad-
ditional value added beyond the project but also 
assure deep-rooted growth and diversification ef-
fects in the longer run. This concerns in particu-
lar local and regional land-use planning, creation 
of economic, organisational, and institutional 
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spillovers, (attempts of) creation of balanced sec-
toral growth paths, etc. Some of the issues may 
be part of the conditionality for LSLA, but others 
go beyond the responsibility and capacity of in-
vestors. These are public tasks, for which public 
entities together with the private sector and ci-
vil society have to create ownership, using the 
impetus of LSLA as a starting point. Develop-
ment cooperation can play an important role in 
facilitating this process and support those issues 
which fall outside the responsibility of the priva-
te sector but exceed the capacities of the public.
Finally, it has to be emphasised that LSLA 
will most certainly remain a minor part of the 
global agricultural setup, appropriate for some ni-
ches and some regions. There is no firm evidence 
that smallholders are necessarily less productive 
than large-scale producers, to the contrary they 
are often better (though at the detriment of labour 
efficiency which leads to low farm incomes), 
they are much more flexible, and there are often 
no good and secure alternatives for all smallhol-
ders in a given region in any manageable lapse 
of time. Smallholder agriculture will continue to 
dominate agriculture in developing countries, at 
least in those where they dominate today. How-
ever, smallholders must organise themselves to 
capture economies of scale, and it is certainly ne-
cessary that not only factor productivity (include 
that of labour) and output but also the average 
size of smallholder farms have to increase if they 
are to provide acceptable working and living con-
ditions. Support to smallholders cannot be sub-
stituted by investor models, and well equipped, 
informed, and productive smallholders and their 
organisations are an important mechanism to avo-
id that LSLA takes place that are against the fun-
damental interests of rural populations.
Notes
1) Biofuel production was a (heavily debated) more 
or less important contributor to this trend (OECD, 
FAO 2011).
2) It has to be noted that quantitative indicators of the 
extent of LSLA are extremely unreliable. One rea-
son is that the basis for counting is not clearly defi-
ned. For instance, in the case of Tanzania more than 
4 million ha are reported to have been requested by 
investors, but only 640,000 ha have been allocated 
and only around 100,000 ha have been granted for-
mal rights of occupancy (Sulle, Nielson 2009).
3) It is generally recognised that there is hardly any 
“free” land available worldwide though the term 
is widely used. Rather, land is under-exploited for 
agriculture. The mentioned number, for instance, 
is calculated by accounting for land in geographi-
cal grid cells that is not cropped but has a reasona-
ble yield potential, is not protected nor under forest 
and inhabited by less than 25 persons/km² (Fisher, 
Shah 2010 cited in Deininger, Byerlee 2011). Un-
der these conditions, by traditional means only a 
fraction of the land can be used for cropping, the 
other being under long-term fallow and/or used 
for extensive livestock and wood gathering.
4) Compare von Braun, Kennedy 1994; Binswanger 
et al. 1995 and Mitchell 2011.
5) Compare FAO 2005, paragraph 8.
6) See the webpage of the international NGO Grain, 
http://www.grain.org/front/.
7) See the frequently cited case of Madagascar where 
a very large land deal of the central government 
with a Korean investor contributed to an overth-
row (Makunike 2009).
8) See The Economist 2011, resuming a conference of 
the Institute of Development Studies at the University 
of Sussex, Brighton, with more than 100 case studies.
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